This forum is at much higher level than ours
http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496347#496347
Dear David - I have now settled back into Shenzhen, where I will stay for the next few weeks, and so I am now in a position to be able to respond to your last comment in the detail that it deserves. Thanks for being so patient with me.
Let me begin by addressing your argument that “from 1911 until the arrival of Chinese troops in Tibet in 1950, Tibet exercised effective control over its territory and engaged in international relations.”
You are overstating your case here a little I think. For starters, you say that “the last Qing Emperor had garrisoned troops in Tibet”, but that the Tibetans “formally expelled them in 1911.” This alone is factually incorrect – a clever distortion of the historical facts by those sympathetic to the Tibetan independence cause. You say that you have read Feigon’s book, so you should know that the account that he provides differs from the one you have just given here – and Feigon himself of course, as you would know, is himself quite biased in the way that he presents information in favour of the Tibetan independence movement. Nevertheless, he does provide a reasonably honest account in most areas, and every history book that I have read on this particular historical matter corresponds to the account provided by Feigon, which reads like this:
The Tibetans did not rise up and expel Chinese troops in an aggressive “assertion of sovereignty” as you have claimed. Rather, in 1911, a rebellion overthrew the Qing dynasty and established a Chinese republic. The Chinese-Manchu army in Tibet consequently “dissolved”. (Feigon, p.114) It was not “expelled”, although this was the case in eastern Tibet (in the areas that are now a part of Yunnan and Sichuan provinces). The Khampas won back some territory against the Chinese warlord who competed with them for territory, using weapons supplied to them by the Russians, incidentally. But fighting over control of Khamdo had been taking place on and off for centuries, and in the same way that warlords throughout the rest of China were always fighting with one another over territorial control.
In 1912 the new President of China, Yuan Shikai, as you said, issued a proclamation claiming Tibet to be an integral part of China.
But you then go on to claim that this same new Chinese Republic “conceded the independence of Tibet and invited Tibet to join the new Republic, thereby acknowledging that Tibet was not as such a part of the Republic.”
This too is factually incorrect. As Feigon and so many others have pointed out, “after the establishment of the Chinese republic, China divided into separate warlord states. Chinese unity was so tenuous that the government feared that granting autonomy to Tibet or any other part of China might set off a chain reaction that would imperil the republic.” (Feigon, p.116) The new Chinese republic did not concede independence to Tibet, as you claim. It merely issued the so-called Manchu-Mongol-Uigur-Tibetan Articles of Favourable Treatment, which guaranteed the four non-Han peoples equality with the Han, and thus a degree of self-government. This is a far cry from granting them independence.
The Thirteenth Dalai Lama did, soon after returning from exile, refer to Tibet as a “small, religious, and independent nation” which he said had driven the Chinese out (an interesting spin of his, since the Tibetans hadn’t driven the Chinese out at all – as I said, the Chinese forces stationed in Tibet had dissolved as a consequence of the Qing overthrow, although the Dalai Lama did seize on this opportunity to formally expel the Residential Commissioner and his entourage.) Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama didn’t enjoy very much support for his assertions of Tibetan independence, not even from among his fellow Tibetans. As Feigon points out, when the Dalai Lama then went on to attempt to regulate some of the monasteries, “the Panchen Lama, the monks of the Drepung monastery, and other prominent members of the religious aristocracy refused to cooperate”, siding instead with the Chinese. (Feigon, p.117)
David, you then try to argue that because border violations occurred between China and Tibet which resulted in Tibet retaining “control of all areas it occupied” and with China having to pay Tibet an indemnity,” that this somehow constitutes evidence of Tibetan independence. None of this implies Tibetan independence.
You are, I assume, referring here to the dividing of Tibet into two zones: Outer and Inner Tibet. Outer Tibet, under the agreement, was to enjoy self-governance, whilst Inner Tibet (now a part of Yunnan and Sichuan and Qinghai provinces) was to be governed by the Chinese. This division was actually proposed by the British, who were out to turn Tibet into a de facto British protectorate in order to prevent Tibet from developing closer ties with Russia. (Feigon, pp.118-119)
The fighting you referred to that took place in the early 1930s once again occurred in the Khamdo region, and you neglect to mention the fact that most of this conflict was sparked by the rivalry that existed among Tibetans themselves. The Beri and Dargyas monasteries fell into conflict in 1931, and some of the Khampas (those of the Beri monastery) sought the support of the Chinese warlord Liu Wenhui, whereas the local Tibetan regiment came to the support of the Dargyas monastery. The Chinese troops fighting on behalf of the Beri monastery had managed to push the Tibetans back as far west as the Yangzi River.
The relationship between Tibet and China looks messy throughout this period, I know, but that’s because both were in turmoil dew largely to the impacts of foreign influence – China was fractured everywhere, and it wasn’t unified until Mao came to power. When we talk of conflict in this region with the “Chinese” we are very often referring to conflicts that occurred between Tibetan factions, where one faction was supported by a Chinese warlord. Such conflicts had little to do with the Chinese republican rulers.
Nevertheless, the fact is David, that even during this messy period, China exercised sovereignty over Tibet, and at no time did China ever give up its sovereign claims. Never. Period.
What matters more today though, as I keep trying to emphasise, is the fact that every single country on earth (except for Britain) recognises China's sovereignty over Tibet, and not one single country (including Britain) recognises Tibet as an independent nation.
This alone legitimises China’s claim to sovereignty over Tibet in international law. Once again, if you doubt me, ask any professional lawyer who specialises in international law. Even during the period that you are referring to, between 1911 and 1950, most of the world, including all of China’s neighbours, regarded China as having sovereignty over Tibet – even the United States, as I pointed out in an earlier comment, remember.
Let us move on now to your next line of contention. You claim to “see some very healthy signs of new order and emerging democracy within the exile community and the government.” Details please? What evidence can you provide to support this?
“Given a gradual transition to some level of self-government, possibly short of full independence,” you say, “I believe that a balanced, open democracy would emerge within Tibet.”
I think you are being way too optimistic and naïve here. As I argued in my earlier comment, there are requisites to the successful dormation of institutions like democracy and the rule of law, and Tibet is seriously lacking in all such requisites – far more so than the rest of China.
As a matter of fact, I have good reason to believe that Tibet, should it today be granted full independence or even self-governance, would very quickly resort back to being an undemocratic theocracy.
Ask yourself this simple question David: what headway has secularisation so far made in twenty-first century Tibet?
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Last edited by joej2005 at 1-8-2008 09:19 ]
