[5月，2008]《远东经济评论》北京欣然接纳正统法西斯主义题目：北京欣然接纳正统法西斯主义
来源：Far Easter Economic Review
http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/may/beijing-embraces-classical-fascism
翻译方式：Gwen译
备注：未经许可，不得转载
这篇文章，真是让我翻得火大呀。不知道有人翻译过没，不过我感到我非翻不可，太多谬论
在原网页上有很多评论，我就没有一一翻出来。也有很多人支持中国，可反对的声音也不小。想知道更多的就点一下原网页
May 2008
Beijing Embraces Classical Fascism
北京欣然接受正统法西斯主义
by Michael Ledeen
In 2002, I speculated that China may be something we have never seen before: a mature fascist state. Recent events there, especially the mass rage in response to Western criticism, seem to confirm that theory. More significantly, over the intervening six years China’s leaders have consolidated their hold on the organs of control—political, economic and cultural. Instead of gradually embracing pluralism as many expected, China’s corporatist elite has become even more entrenched.
在2002年，我就推测中国可能会成为一个我们从未见过的中国：一个成熟的法西斯国家。最近发生的事件中，特别是群众对西方批评的愤怒，这样似乎可以证实这一观点理论。更重要的是，间隔六年后，中国政府的领导已巩固了其对机关的控制－政治、经济、文化。中国不是逐步尽可能地括大其多元性，相反地中国的社会主义的中坚分子却已变得更加根深蒂固
Even though they still call themselves communists, and the Communist Party rules the country, classical fascism should be the starting point for our efforts to understand the People’s Republic. Imagine Italy 50 years after the fascist revolution. Mussolini would be dead and buried, the corporate state would be largely intact, the party would be firmly in control, and Italy would be governed by professional politicians, part of a corrupt elite, rather than the true believers who had marched on Rome. It would no longer be a system based on charisma, but would instead rest almost entirely on political repression, the leaders would be businesslike and cynical, not idealistic, and they would constantly invoke formulaic appeals to the grandeur of the “great Italian people,” “endlessly summoned to emulate the greatness of its ancestors.”
即使他们仍称自己是共产党人或共产主议政权国家，但在我们努力理解那人民的共和国时应该用经典的法西斯主义作为出发点。想一下法西斯革命后意大利的五十年。墨索里尼死了并被被埋葬，国有企业毫发无伤，党牢牢地掌控全局，意大利被专业政客－腐败的精英分子中的一部分――统治，而不是真正的信徒，那些在罗马游行的信徒。这不再是一个以教皇的指导力为基础的系统制度，而是几乎全部依靠施加政治压力来统治国家，国家领导人更像是在办实事、愤世嫉俗而不是空想。他们不断向那些冠冕坣煌的“伟大的意大利”，那些“孜孜不倦倦仿效伟大先人的人们”引援那些公式化的呼吁。
Substitute in the “great Chinese people” and it all sounds familiar. We are certainly not dealing with a Communist regime, either politically or economically, nor do Chinese leaders, even those who followed the radical reformer Deng Xiaoping, seem to be at all interested in treading the dangerous and uneven path from Stalinism to democracy. They know that Mikhail Gorbachev fell when he tried to control the economy while giving political freedom. They are attempting the opposite, keeping a firm grip on political power while permitting relatively free areas of economic enterprise. Their political methods are quite like those used by the European fascists 80 years ago.
取而代之的是“伟大的中国人民”，这听起来是那么地熟悉。我们当然不是在谈论处理共产政权，也不会是政治或者经济，当然也不是中国的领导者，甚至那些激进改革家－邓小平的追随者。好像所有兴趣都在从斯大林主义到民主主义这条危险又坎坷的路上。他们知道是戈尔巴乔夫在试图掌控经济又同时释放政治权时失利下台的。所以他们现在在向相当的方向努力即，在政治上紧紧掌权，在某些经济领域上释放相对的自由。他们所使用的政治手段像极了80年前欧洲的法西斯
Unlike traditional communist dictators—Mao, for example—who extirpated traditional culture and replaced it with a sterile Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace the glories of China’s long history. Their passionate reassertion of the greatness of past dynasties has both entranced and baffled Western observers, because it does not fit the model of an “evolving communist system.”
不同于传统的共产独裁者－毛泽东——例如，他曾根除传统文化并想用不成熟的马克思列宁主义来取而代之。中国现在狂热地、情不自禁地为中国悠久历史的辉煌而。他们狂热地重审历史朝代的伟大，这即让西方人民着迷，也让西方人民迷惑不已，因为这并不与“进步的共产主义模式”模式相符。，
Yet the fascist leaders of the 1920s and 1930s used exactly the same device. Mussolini rebuilt Rome to provide a dramatic visual reminder of ancient glories, and he used ancient history to justify the conquest of Libya and Ethiopia. Hitler’s favorite architect built neoclassical buildings throughout the Third Reich, and his favorite operatic composer organized festivals to celebrate the country’s mythic past.
然后，在19世纪20和30年代，法西斯领导者就用了完全一样的手段。墨索里尼为人们提供一个生动的古代辉煌的回顾，他重建罗马。而且他用古代史去证明征服利比亚和埃塞俄比亚是合理的。在整个第三帝国，希特勒最喜欢的建筑师兴建新古典主义楼宇，他最喜欢的歌剧作曲家举办艺术节来庆祝这个国家神话般的过去。
Like their European predecessors, the Chinese claim a major role in the world because of their history and culture, not just on the basis of their current power, or scientific or cultural accomplishments. China even toys with some of the more bizarre notions of the earlier fascisms, such as the program to make the country self-sufficient in wheat production—the same quest for autarky that obsessed both Hitler and Mussolini.
像他们欧洲的前辈一样，中国宣称自己在世界重要的地位，因为他们的历史和文化，而不仅基于他们现在的势力，或科学，文化成就。中国甚至玩弄起那些早期法西斯主义奇怪的概念，比如使小麦产量能让国家自己自足的项目——同样于让希特勒和墨索里尼痴迷的自足追求
To be sure, the world is much changed since the first half of the last century. It’s much harder (and sometimes impossible) to go it alone. Passions for total independence from the outside world are tempered by the realities of today’s global economy, and China’s appetite for oil and other raw materials is properly legendary. But the Chinese, like the European fascists, are intensely xenophobic, and obviously worry that their people may turn against them if they learn too much about the rest of the world. They consequently work very hard to dominate the flow of information. Just ask Google, forced to cooperate with the censors in order to work in China.
能肯定的是，世界在上世纪的上半叶有了很大的改变。竟然，孤军奋斗是很困难的（或者是不可能的）。与外界彻底独立出来的热情被现代的全球化经济所缓和下来，但中国对石油和原材料的欲望在一定程度是享有盛名的。但中国人，像欧洲的法西斯者一样，他们有着激烈的恐外心理，而且明显地担心着他们的人民对外面世界知道太多后，会背叛他们。所以他们为主宰媒体信息做了很多工作。不信，问问谷歌。他们为了在中国的生存被迫与审查合作。
Some scholars of contemporary China see the Beijing regime as very nervous, and perhaps even unstable, and they are encouraged in this belief when they see recent events such as the eruption of popular sentiment against the Tibetan monks’ modest protests. That view is further reinforced by similar outcries against most any criticism of Chinese performance, from human rights to air pollution, and from preparations for the Olympic Games to the failure of Chinese quality control in food production and children’s toys. The recent treatment of French retailer Carrefour at the hands of Chinese nationalists is a case in point. It has been publicly excoriated and shunned because France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy dared to consider the possibility of boycotting the Olympics.
一些中国当代学者指出北京的政权制度非常地紧张，或许不稳定。而且当他们看到了最近的事件，如，对西藏僧人温和抗议进行普通反对的爆发，就更相信这一观点了。这一观点被类似的对中国人表现批评的抗议，从人权问题到环境问题，从奥林匹克的准备工作到在食物和儿童玩具质控的失败都得到了进一步加强了。由中国的民族主义导致的最近法国零售商家加乐福在中国的遭遇就是一个恰当的例子。加乐福被公开地痛斥和排斥，这因为法国的总统尼古拉、萨尔科齐有胆量考虑抵制奥林匹克的可能。
In all these cases, it is tempting to conclude that the regime is worried about its own survival, and, in order to rally nationalist passions, feels compelled to portray the country as a global victim. Perhaps they are right. The strongest evidence to support the theory of insecurity at the highest levels of Chinese society is the practice of the “princelings” (wealthy children of the ruling elites) to buy homes in places such as the United States, Canada and Australia. These are not luxury homes of the sort favored by wealthy businessman and officials from the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Rather they are typically “normal” homes of the sort a potential émigré might want to have in reserve in case things went bad back home.
上面所有的例子，都让我们得出这样一个结论：这个政权在担心他们自己的生存问题，并且为了重整民族主义热情，他们必须得把自己塑造成一个全球性受害者。也许你是对的。支持对中国最上层社会的无安全感这一理论最有力的证据是“太子党”（执政党精英的有钱子女）的事实，他们在像美国，加拿大，澳大利亚购买房子。这些并不像中东富有的石油国的那些有钱商人和官员一样享有豪华的家园或诸如此类的东西。更准确点，他们只是典型的“普通”诸如此类的东西，那种潜在移民者以防会回来而想要准备的备用东西。
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that eruptions of nationalist passion do indeed worry the regime, and Chinese leaders have certainly tamped down such episodes in the past. In recent days, the regime has even reached out to the Dalai Lama himself in an apparent effort to calm the situation, after previously enouncing the “Dalai clique” as a dangerous form of separatism and even treason.
此外，我们有理由相信爆发的民族主义激情的确是担心政权而产生的。中国领导者在过去肯定多次摆平过这类事件。在最近几天，在早前宣布dl喇嘛是危险的分裂主义分子甚至是叛国者后，政权甚至亲自找到dl喇嘛，这明显就是想平静下来局势。
On the other hand, the cult of victimhood was always part of fascist culture. Just like Germany and Italy in the interwar period, China feels betrayed and humiliated, and seeks to avenge her many historic wounds. This is not necessarily a true sign of anxiety; it’s an integral part of the sort of hypernationalism that has always been at the heart of all fascist movements and regimes. We cannot look into the souls of the Chinese tyrants, but I doubt that China is an intensely unstable system, riven by the democratic impulses of capitalism on the one hand, and the repressive practices of the regime on the other. This is a mature fascism, not a frenzied mass movement, and the current regime is not composed of revolutionary fanatics. Today’s Chinese leaders are the heirs of two very different revolutions, Mao’s and Deng’s. The first was a failed communist experiment; the second is a fascist transformation whose future is up for grabs.
在另一方面，邪教受害者一直都是法西斯主义文化的一部分，就好像在次战争时期时的德国和意大利一样，中国感到了背叛和屈辱，也在旨在为自己的历史伤口报复。这不一定是一个真的焦虑迹象；但它却是炒作民族主义诸如此类必不可少的一部分，而炒作民族主义是所有法本斯主议运动和政权的核心内容。我们不能去详查中国是暴政的典范，但我们怀疑中国是一个极不稳定的制度，一方面由资本主义的民主推动力，另一方面由政权的镇压习惯而四分五裂的系统。这是一个成熟的法西斯主义，而不是一个疯狂的群众运动。当政者不是由革命狂热分子组成的。今天中国的领导者是两种不同革命方式的继承者——毛泽东和邓小平。前者是在一个失败的共产主义试验者；后暑是一个法西斯主义转型者——对其的未来进行公开竞标。
If the fascist model is correct, we should not be at all surprised by the recent rhetoric or mass demonstrations. Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy were every bit as sensitive to any sign of foreign criticism as the Chinese today, both because victimhood is always part of the definition of such states, and because it’s an essential technique of mass control. The violent denunciations of Westerners who criticize Chinese repression may not be a sign of internal anxiety or weakness. They may instead be a sign of strength, a demonstration of the regime’s popularity. Remember that European fascism did not fall as the result of internal crisis—it took a bloody world war to bring it down. Fascism was so alarmingly popular neither Italians not Germans produced more than token resistance until the war began to be lost. It may well be that the mass condemnation of Western calls for greater political tolerance is in fact a sign of political success.
如果法西斯的模型是正确的，那我们都不应该为最近花言巧语或大规模示威而感动惊讶。希特勒的德国和墨索里尼的意大利都像中国现在一样对每一点有外国批评的迹象那么敏感，都因为把自己塑造成受害者是这样的政权国家的定义成分，因为这是重要的质量检控手法。中国人强烈地遣责对中国的镇压政策进行评论的西方人，也许这并不能表明内内部焦虑或软弱。这可能相反显示他们的强壮，实证了这个政体强大的人口力量。记住欧洲法西斯主义并不是因为内部危机而垮台――而是血腥的世界大战让它垮台的。直到他们在战争中开始失利，法西斯如此惊人地流行，这并不是德国，也不是意大利引发这不只令牌似的抵抗。这样就有充分理由说明这大规模对西方的遣责来要求更多的政治宽容事实上是他们政治成功的表现。
Since classical fascism had such a brief life span, it is hard to know whether or not a stable, durable fascist state is possible. Economically, the corporate state, of which the current Chinese system is a textbook example, may prove more flexible and adaptable than the rigid central planning that doomed communism in the Soviet Empire and elsewhere (although the travails of Japan, which also tried to combine capitalist enterprise with government guidance, show the kinds of problems China will likely face). Our brief experience with fascism makes it difficult to evaluate the possibilities of political evolution, and the People’s Republic is full of secrets. But prudent
strategists would do well to assume that the regime will be around for a while longer—perhaps a lot longer.
因为我们知道正统的法西斯主义只是昙花一现，所以这很难确定稳定、长久的法西斯政府是不是可能的。从经济上来看，国有企业，目前中国的制度就是一本可以为例的教科书。证明更灵活的，更具适应性的经济制度比死板的中央计划经济更具合理性，因为中央经济在曾注定了苏联帝国和其它地方的失败（即使曾经试图将资本主义企业与政府的指导相结合来运行经济的日本，这样艰苦劳动的日本指出了中国以后将会面对的问题）。简短的法西斯主义经验，让我们很难估量政治进化的可能。并且这人民的共和国是充满了秘密。但审慎的战略家们会在装出这个政府会活跃较长，也许更长时间。
If it is a popular, fascist regime, should the world prepare for some difficult and dangerous confrontations with the People’s Republic? Twentieth-century fascist states were very aggressive; Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were both expansionist nations. Is it not likely that China will similarly seek to enlarge its domain?
如果法西斯政权是广受欢迎的，那全世界是不是应该为与人民共和国困难而危险的对峙而做些准备呢？二十世纪的法西斯国家非常具有侵略性；纳粹德国和法西斯意大利均是扩张主义的国家。那中国也会同样寻求扩大其域？
I believe the answer is “yes, but.” Many Chinese leaders might like to see their sway extend throughout the region, and beyond. China’s military is not so subtly preparing the capability to defeat U.S. forces in Asia in order to prevent intervention in any conflict on its periphery. No serious student of China doubts the enormous ambitions of both the leadership and the masses. But, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, the Chinese tyrants do not urgently need quick geographical expansion to demonstrate the glory of their country and the truth of their vision. For the moment, at least, success at home and global recognition of Chinese accomplishments seem to be enough. Since Chinese fascism is less ideological than its European predecessors, Chinese leaders are far more flexible than Hitler and Mussolini.
我相信答案是肯定的。但是，许多中国领导人也想看其势力在整个地区扩张，而且想扩张得更大。中国军队并没有那么精巧地预备好打败美军在亚洲的军力，来防止对其周边地区的任何冲突的干预。没有一个理智的中国学生会怀疑两方领导和人民群众的巨大野心。但是，与希特勒和墨索里尼不同，中国的暴君们并不急着快速进行地域扩张，以此来显示其国家的荣耀，显示远见卓识的正确性。就目前而言，至少，国内的成功和被全求承认的中国成就似乎已经足够了。因为较其欧洲前辈，中国没那么空想主义，中国的领导人远远比希特勒与墨索里尼灵活得多
Nonetheless, the short history of classical fascism suggests that it is only a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with the West. That is built into the dna of all such regimes. Sooner or later, Chinese leaders will feel compelled to demonstrate the superiority of their system, and even the most impressive per capita GDP will not do. Superiority means others have to bend their knees, and cater to the wishes of the dominant nation. Just as Mussolini saw the colonization of Africa and the invasion of Greece and the Balkans as necessary steps in the establishment of a new fascist empire, so the Chinese are likely to demand tribute from their neighbors—above all, the Chinese on the island nation of Taiwan, in order to add the recovery of lost territory to the regime’s list of accomplishments. Even today, at a time when the regime is seeking praise, not tribute, in the run-up to the Olympic Games, there are bellicose overtones to official rhetoric.
虽然如此，正统法西斯短暂的历史暗示中国与西方进行面对面的较量只是时间问题。因为它早就写进了所有这种制度的DNA里了。迟早中国的领导人会感到不得不展现其制度的优越性，而事实上最让人难忘的人均国内生产总值却不能证明这一点。优越性就意味着别人都要卑躬屈膝，都要来迎合这优越国家的意愿。正如墨索里尼认为非洲的殖民化和希腊与巴尔干地区的侵略行为都是建立其新法西斯帝国的必要步骤。所以中国才可能要求其领居的敬意——首先，是岛上的台湾民族的中国人民，这种的复得失地是为了在这种政权的成就单上添上漂亮的一笔。即使到了今天，在这个政权正在寻求赞扬而不是颂词敬意。在奥林匹克的预备阶段，一些官方花言巧语却有着主战的弦外之音。
How, then, should the democracies deal with China? The first step is to disabuse ourselves of the notion that wealth is the surest guarantor of peace. The West traded with the Soviet Union, and gave them credits as well, but it did not prevent the Kremlin from expanding into the Horn of Africa, or sponsoring terrorist groups in Europe and the Middle East. A wealthy China will not automatically be less inclined to go to war over Taiwan, or, for that matter, to wage or threaten war with Japan.
但是，那么，民主国家应该与中国打交道吗？第一步，是要使自己省悟认识到财富是最可靠的和平保证，这个概念。西方与苏联进行贸易，并且也给他们贷款，但这并不能阻止克里姆林把势力扩张到非常的合恩，也没有阻止他赞助在欧洲和中东的恐怖主义集团。富裕的中国不会自动地减轻向台湾宣战的倾向，或者，因为这样，减少发动或用战争威胁日本的可能。
Indeed, the opposite may be true—the richer and stronger China becomes, the more they build up their military might, the more likely such wars may be. It follows that the West must prepare for war with China, hoping thereby to deter it. A great Roman once said that if you want peace, prepare for war. This is sound advice with regard to a fascist Chinese state that wants to play a global role.
事实上，相反的说话可能是正确的——中国越是富有，越是强大，他就越会增加其军事力量，越有可能发动这样的战争。这意味着西方必须做好与中国开战的准备，希望能从而阻止他。一个伟大的罗马人曾说过，如果你想要和平，那就准备好打仗吧。这个完美的建议正适合于想要发挥全球性作用的法西斯中国。
Meanwhile, we should do what we can to convince the people of China that their long-term interests are best served by greater political freedom, no matter how annoying and chaotic that may sometimes be. I think we can trust the Chinese leaders on this one. Any regime as palpably concerned about the free flow of information, knows well that ideas about freedom might be very popular. Let’s test that hypothesis, by talking directly to “the billion.” In today’s world, we can surely find ways to reach them.
同时，我们应该尽可能地劝服中国人民，他们的长远利益是应该服务于更大的政治自由，无论这有时会让人多恼，多混乱。我想我们应该在这一点上相信中国领导人。任何关心信息的自由流通的政权都很清楚地知道自由思想将有可能很受欢迎。通过直接与“亿万人民”交谈，让我们考验一下这个假说吧。在当今世界，我们肯定能找到与他们交谈的方法的。
If we do not take such steps, our risk will surely increase, and explosions of rage, manipulated or spontaneous, will recur. Eventually they will take the form of real actions.
如果我们不采取这些步子，我们的风险肯定会增加，被人操纵或自发的愤怒将会重演。最终他们会采取真正的行动。
Mr. Ledeen is an expert on U.S. foreign policy at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. He served as a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Ledeen是美国外交政策专家——一个为公共政策研究的美国企业研究所。他是在中羡经济与安全审议委员会从的委员
[
本帖最后由 rebecca514 于 2008-6-4 02:07 编辑 ]
