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【2008.09.29 Newsweek】 The Echoes Of Crisis

Resource: http://www.newsweek.com/id/160159/output/print

The Echoes Of Crisis


The meltdown is real, but its impact beyond finance is still unclear.


Zachary Karabell
NEWSWEEK
From the magazine issue dated Sep 29, 2008

There has never been a week like this!" "There is no playbook!" "The worst financial crisis since the Great Depression!" These phrases and others of equal hyperbole were repeated any number of times on Wall Street these past weeks. No doubt the drama has been spectacular. In the space of ten days, the U.S. government took over two mortgage-bond behemoths, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and assumed de facto control of one of the world's largest insurance companies, AIG. Two of the oldest and most renowned investment banks, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, came to an end; Merrill was acquired by Bank of America for about $50 billion; and Lehman was forced into bankruptcy, with some of its more-valuable assets and employees picked up for pennies by Britain's Barclays Bank. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs saw their stocks plummet and then boomerang back up. Global stock indices lost and then gained trillions in value, and central banks injected hundreds of billions to prevent the global economic system from freezing. To cap it off, the U.S. government announced a far-reaching plan to assume responsibility for the bad mortgages that triggered all this in the first place.

When someone shouts "Fire" in a crowded theater, the person who stands up and asks for calm usually get knocked down. That doesn't make him wrong. The suggestion that the current crisis may not be quite so critical isn't finding much traction these days, but that doesn't make it false.

The meltdown of Wall Street and the resulting government intervention are real and will reshape the industry. But it's much less apparent what the ramifications are beyond the financial industry. The link between Main Street and Wall Street has always been mysterious. There have been Wall Street crises that barely touched the broader economy (think the Panic of 1907 and the implosion of Long Term Capital Management in 1998), and there have been Main Street downturns that have only marginally hurt Wall Street (the 1981-82 recession). Many people say that today's crisis on Wall Street will have dire effects on the "real" economy, but for now, at least, those assertions are just that. The U.S. economy, at least as measured by GDP, has shown surprising growth through the first six months of the year, up 3.3 percent in the second quarter alone. Consumer spending has flattened but not collapsed under the weight of higher gas and food prices and tighter credit. Stocks are down, but in the last presidential election year of 2004, the only real gains in the market happened between late October and the end of the year. On Main Street, there may not be much to celebrate, but it's a far cry from what's happening on Wall Street.

And it's not even happening everywhere on Wall Street. Trillion-dollar asset-management companies such as Fidelity and Vanguard, for instance, are doing fine, though the decline in stock prices is a negative for them. Companies that make money processing transactions, ranging from massive banks like State Street and Bank of New York, haven't imploded. Credit-card companies like Capital One, and Visa (which had one of the most successful initial public offerings in years earlier this summer) have not seen the consumer defaults that the dire rhetoric would suggest. In free-fall are investment banks and anyone involved in mortgages and their many derivatives, but parts of Wall Street are business as normal, though you'd never know that judging from the mood. After all, Bank of America—flush with consumer deposits from Main Street—actually had $50 billion to buy Merrill Lynch.

Even the absolute size of the problems isn't as dire as depicted. Lehman Brothers just before it went bankrupt had a market value of $2.9 billion and about 25,000 employees. Most of its value is now wiped out, though 10,000 of those workers will find new jobs at Barclays. But even at its height, it was far smaller than hundreds of companies that get less press. Take a company called Polycom, which makes teleconferencing equipment; you've probably seen their triangle-shaped units in some office or another. It had a market value of about $2.4 billion. If Polycom were, hypothetically, to go bankrupt tomorrow, would people be tearing their hair out about the end of teleconferencing? Doubtful.

Of course, unlike the Polycoms of the world, investment banks and insurers like AIG have trillions of dollars in outstanding assets, obligations, and contracts. But that doesn't mean trillions of dollars in losses. Only a portion of their business is tied up with mortgages and derivatives, and while some of those might be worthless, most aren't. We know that because even in a terrible, dysfunctional market, they have been purchased.

The derivatives built around mortgages ultimately rest on underlying assets, namely homes. Even as those homes decline in value—whether in the United States, or the U.K., or Spain—they are still worth something. Most home price decreases are in the range of 10 percent to 20 percent, and most mortgages are not in default. As a result, other financial institutions have been buying the "paper" of distressed financial companies for 60 cents to 80 cents on the dollar. Earlier this year, Merrill Lynch sold some of its worst assets for about 30 cents on the dollar, but those were the lowest of the low and represented a small portion of the company's holdings. Accounting rules passed in the wake of Enron, however, force companies to mark down these derivatives even when markets are spiraling downward and there are no buyers. And when there are no buyers, even things of value can be worth nothing.

The fear is that the system unravels rapidly, triggering virtual runs on the banks that leave them unable to meet the demands for payment. Some of that has already happened inside Wall Street. The fear that the contagion was about to spread to Main Street was stoked when a $60 billion money-market fund run by Reserve Trust halted redemptions, and its shares started trading at 97 cents on the dollar. Yet the government quickly provided $180 billion in backing, and here as well, the problem was panic—after all, few people's lives would be completely ruined losing 3 cents on a dollar.

Swift government action also separates the current financial implosion from Great Depression-like meltdowns. The U.S. government spent a trillion dollars on Iraq in the past five years—though that money will never yield a penny. With the U.S. economy generating $14 trillion every year, the government is more than able to provide a several hundred billion dollar backstop to bad mortgages, if that proves necessary to halt the rippling panic on Wall Street or contain the next bank failure, whether it is Washington Mutual or someone else. Not a great outcome, but not the sum of our fears.

The conventional wisdom is that Wall Street is the center of the global financial system, the axis around which all revolves, and if it breaks, if the current government bailout fails to stem the bleeding, the entire world is imperiled. Short-term, there's some truth in that: the world needs liquidity (cash) just as the body needs water. But the world needs a lot of things: electricity and transportation, for instance. In 2002, the global airline industry imploded in the wake of 9/11. Globally, 150,000 people lost their jobs—more than the dire projections of job losses this year on Wall Street. The U.S. government provided $15 billion in bailout funds to airlines in November 2002 alone. In 2008, faced with sharply higher fuel costs, the U.S. airline industry has already shed 22,000 jobs, and has notched tens of billions in losses. Yet the collapse of the airline industry in both 2002 and 2008 did not lead to claims that global travel was imperiled or that the system as we know it was teetering on the brink.
The bottom line—there's clearly an echo-chamber problem here. The people who report on Wall Street by and large live in the same place as the people who work on Wall Street. A similar problem exists in London with the City and Fleet Street. The analysts who assess what is happening on behalf of investors are employed by the same companies that they are supposed to be analyzing objectively. The agencies that rate the bonds of companies are part of the same nexus. And of course the traders who buy and sell are intertwined as well. Expecting any of these to have perspective is a bit like asking someone in the eye of a storm what they feel about wind and rain. Rumors spread easily, and fear can get stoked to wildfire intensity in a matter of days. The 24/7 news cycle doesn't help; drama and crisis are good for ratings.

But Wall Street is not the world. It is an industry that is central to the world, but it is one input rather than the input. In the past five years, it has lost much of its centrality. For much of the second part of the 20th century, Wall Street was a major source of global capital. Today, it needs to look elsewhere for capital. In the past five years alone, there has been a massive wealth transfer away from the United States and in both the oil-producing regions such as the Gulf and goods-producing regions such as China. At least $7 trillion sits in the sovereign wealth funds and central banks of countries ranging from China to Dubai. The total market cap of the five independent U.S. investment banks at their height: less than $500 billion.

While this shift may signify a relative decrease in U.S. power, it provides a cushion for the global economic system, a system that most U.S. companies and consumers are enmeshed in. Global capital may not flow exactly where it is needed exactly when it is needed, but it changes the equation. There may not be enough capital on Wall Street to float ailing investment banks. There is more than enough capital globally to do that many times over. Sovereign wealth funds already helped Citibank through some of its trouble at the end of 2007; China's SWF just took a larger stake in Morgan Stanley; and they could very well step in again if needed.

Finally, there is the tricky question of Main Street. The more than 400 publicly-traded companies of the S&P 500 that have nothing to do with mortgages and don't make cars have been doing quite well. Earnings of financial companies were down more than 100 percent for the first six months of 2008; the rest saw their earnings up nearly 10 percent, with many individual companies like Google up substantially more. True, these companies function in a global marketplace that is expanding more quickly than Europe or the United States, especially China. They can squeeze more efficiency (fewer workers, more technology) out of their business. But they are also doing well because people and companies outside of Wall Street are simply going about their business.
On Main Street, cell-phone stores are selling iPhones; electronics stores are selling flat screens and game consoles; nail parlors are cutting nails; fast food is selling fast; and medical-equipment companies are making artificial joints, bandages and pacemakers. Ask the average person in Houston or Omaha what they think about Lehman Brothers or AIG, and most of them would probably say they've never heard of either. And for good reason: those companies don't impact their lives meaningfully.

Dark days on Wall Street for sure, but catastrophe for society, that is a stretch. As stock markets continue their wild gyrations, pension plans and retirees who need the cash now are pressured, yet stocks go up just as quickly as they go down. Others will continue to put money in their retirement plans and may find years from now that those investments performed spectacularly. Wall Street will consolidate, and some firms will thrive and profit having picked up solid franchises of imploding companies. And then some other crisis will occur, unexpected, and people will once again say that it's the worst they've ever seen, and life will go on.

Karabell is president of RiverTwice Research and senior adviser to Business for Social Responsibility.


The Echoes Of Crisis.JPG
2008-10-21 19:38
The Echoes Of Crisis-2.JPG
2008-10-21 19:41

占楼待译

如题;   AC 编译部-英语组 将组织翻译,如果有兴趣翻译的网友,烦请跟帖留名,以避免AC 英语组 与网友朋友 重复劳动。多谢!
文章较长,再强占一楼,咔咔~  o3O147)

PS,占楼为盖楼,网友莫怪~
俺来拆楼~
翻译还没出呀,那个急………………

[ 本帖最后由 v3_devil 于 2008-10-21 20:32 编辑 ]
nicolle姐真厉害,全是长文诶。看的时间都不够哦。等翻译啊。
让给妩人了

[ 本帖最后由 dakelv 于 2008-10-21 09:46 编辑 ]
野鹤闲云
原帖由 dakelv 于 2008-10-21 22:38 发表
我全领了。
dakelv是工作狂。
  
原帖由 v3_devil 于 2008-10-21 20:10 发表
翻译还没出呀,那个急………………
这位朋友真的是位急性子~ 看一下我的发帖时间和文章长度。。。那个,翻译不是一摁按钮译文就出来了。。。编译组手动翻译并非网上软件机译。。。
别急别急,少将正在翻译中。。。
原帖由 v3_devil 于 2008-10-21 06:10 发表
翻译还没出呀,那个急………………
野鹤闲云
汗,支持!!
原帖由 Nicolle 于 2008-10-21 23:47 发表


这位朋友真的是位急性子~ 看一下我的发帖时间和文章长度。。。那个,翻译不是一摁按钮译文就出来了。。。编译组手动翻译并非网上软件机译。。。 ...
偶知道是手动翻译,谁让偶是没文化自己看不懂呢,,,,,,,,,,再次期盼中^^^^^^^^^
叶子的离开是风的追求,还是树木的不挽留,在爱的世界里,没有谁对不起谁,只有谁不珍惜谁,绑不住我的心,就别说我花心!
先译出部分:其他将在数小时内译出,汗,今天比较忙,向筒子们致歉。

                                         危机在回荡

崩溃是真实发生的,但它在金融范围之外的影响目前还不清楚。

扎切里·凯拉贝尔

新闻周刊

杂志发表   2008年9月29日

      “从来没有过这样的一个星期!”“无章可循!”“这是大萧条以来最大的金融危机!” 在过去几周的华尔街内,这些话以及比这些话还夸张的话任何时候都能听到数遍。毫无疑问,这场戏剧极富观赏性。在十天内,美国接管了两个抵押债券巨头,房利美和房贷美,并实际接管世界上最大的保险公司-美国国际集团。两大最古老最负盛名的投资银行雷曼兄弟和美林证券宣告走到尽头;美林公司被美国银行以500亿美元收购;雷曼被迫破产,而英国巴克莱银行接收了它为更有价值的一些资产和雇员。摩根士丹利和高盛公司眼看着自己的股票暴跌,接着又回升。全球股票指数下跌,然后又上涨了数万亿美元,同时中央银行注入数千亿美元以阻止全球经济体系走入严冬。为了摆脱经济冰冻,美国政府宣布一项意义深远的计划,承担起对从开始起引发所有这一切(危机)的不良贷款的职责。

       当有人在熙熙攘攘的剧院里大声喊道“着火了”,站起来请求人们保持冷静的人通常会被撞倒。尽管他并没有错。这些天来那些关于目前的危机可能并不是十分危急的观点并没有找到足够的说服力,但是这并不意味着(不是十分危急的观点)是错的。

       华尔街的崩溃以及由此导致的政府干预是真实发生的,这些都将重塑改组金融行业。但它对于金融业之外的影响却显得很不清晰。大资产阶级和平民百姓的联系一直令人难以理解。华尔街的危机曾经几乎触及到更广泛的经济层面(比如1907年的大恐慌和1998年的长期资本管理基金破产),而且平民大众的衰退仅仅只能勉强伤害到华尔街(如1981-82年期间的经济衰退)的皮毛。很多人声称今天华尔街的这场危机将对“现实”经济产生可怕的影响,但是到现在为止,这些断言至少还只是断言。美国的经济至少以国内生产总值来衡量,在今年的头六个月已经显示出了惊人的增长,独一无二的在第二季度增长百分之三点三。消费支出只是出现萎缩而不是在汽油和食品价格上涨和信贷更加紧缩重压下的崩溃。股市虽然下跌,但是在美国总统选举年的2004年,市场唯一真正的收益产生于10月末到04年底之间。对于平民大众来说,这可能没有多少值得庆贺,但与发生在华尔街的危机却相去甚远。

       而且并不是华尔街的任何角落都会发生这种(危机)情况。上万亿美元的资产管理公司,例如富达和先锋,虽然股票价格的下降对它们产生了消极影响,但它们却依然非常的成功。那些提供金钱处理交易业务的公司即从道富银行到纽约银行的大规模银行,都没有崩毁。信用卡公司如美国第一资本投资国际集团和Visa(VISA刚刚在今年夏天进行了一次美国有史以来最为成功的公开募股)迄今为止还没有消费者拖欠债务的情况发生,这不禁使人想起那些雄辩的(危机)言论。产生暴跌的都是那些投资银行和所有涉及抵押贷款和抵押贷款衍生领域的方面,尽管从现在的氛围上判断你永远也不知道,部分华尔街业务依然正常。毕竟拥有平民大众无数存款的美国银行,仍然有实力而且实际上已经以500亿美元收购了美林公司。

       这个问题即使可能造成的最大影响也并不会如它被描述的那样可怕。雷曼兄弟公司在它刚刚倒闭前市场价值依然有29亿美元并且有着约25000名的员工。虽然它大部分的价值现在已经蒸发掉,但其中的一万名员工依然能在新主顾巴克莱找到新的就业机会。而且即使在它危机的顶点,它(的危机)也远远比其他较少被报道的数以百计的公司小。举一个宝利通公司的例子,该公司制造电信设备;你可能在一些办公室或其他地方看过他们的三角型徽标。它的市场价值约为24亿美元。假设宝利通公司要在明天破产,人们将会因为电信业的末路而锤胸顿足吗?这恐怕难以预测吧。

       当然,与世界上的宝利通们所不同的是,美国国际集团保险公司(AIG)和那些投资银行拥有数万亿美元的未偿还资产、债务和合同。但是这并不意味着完全会损失掉这数万亿美元。它们的业务仅仅只有一部分和抵押贷款及其衍生品有密切联系,而且虽然其中的一些可能毫无价值,但是大部分却并非如此。我们知道(这些),是因为即使是在可怕的、紊乱的市场里依然有人会购买它们。

       抵押贷款的衍生品最终取决于基础资产,即房产。即使那些房屋的价格下降-但无论是在美国或英国、西班牙,他们仍然有着价值。大多数房屋价格跌幅都在百分之十到百分之二十,并且大部分的贷款没有被拖欠。其结果就是其他的金融机构以每美元60美分至80美分的低价格购买了不良金融公司的“纸张(意为账目或其他)”。今年早些时候美林证券公司以约30美分的低价出售了它最坏资产的一部分,但是这些都是糟糕资产的最低价格而且仅仅代表了该公司所持股一小份额。根据紧随安然公司破产后推行的法令,企业被强迫无论如何都得将这些衍生品压低,即使在市场急剧下滑、而且没有买主的情况下。要知道如果没有买主,即使有价值的东西也会变得一文不值。

[ 本帖最后由 妩人少将 于 2008-10-22 23:19 编辑 ]
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